The Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal Law: Recent

Trends and Possible Explanations by Hamilton, C.
3  Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) 
The Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal Law: Recent 
Trends and Possible Explanations 
 
Dr. C. Hamilton*  
 
The existence of four contemporary threats to the presumption of innocence in 
England and Wales has been posited by Ashworth. The aim of this article is to 
take stock of the law in the Republic of Ireland impacting upon this cornerstone 
principle of Irish criminal law. The article explores Ashworth’s arguments in 
more detail and examines the justifications for the presumption of innocence 
generally and in an Irish context. Case law and legislation which may have 
impacted on its scope and practical import for the accused are considered prior to 
somewhat mixed conclusions being drawn about the relative health of the 
presumption in Ireland. The final part of the article briefly examines some 
arguments which have been advanced for contemporary developments in the 
field of due process protections. 
 
I - Introduction 
 
The existence of four contemporary threats to the presumption of innocence 
in England and Wales has recently been posited by Ashworth.1 In his examination of 
legislation and case law impacting on the presumption, he concludes “generally 
recognised as a fundamental right it may be, but its precise significance for the 
defendant is so contingent as to raise doubts.”2 In an Irish context, Hamilton too has 
written of the “growing insignificance of the presumption of innocence for accused 
persons” such that its “tangible benefits [appear] little in evidence” in our criminal 
justice system.3 In light of these rather depressing diagnoses, the aim of this paper is 
to attempt to take stock of the law in the Republic of Ireland impacting upon the 
presumption of innocence as well as to search for some possible explanations for 
recent developments. Part II of this paper explores Ashworth’s arguments in more 
detail and examines the justifications for the presumption of innocence generally and 
in an Irish context before proceeding in Part III to consider the case law and 
legislation which may have impacted on its scope and practical import for the 
accused. Part IV briefly examines some arguments which have been advanced for 
contemporary developments in the field of due process protections. 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Criminology, Dublin Institute of Technology. 
1 A. Ashworth, “Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence” (2006) 10 E. & P. 241-279 
[hereinafter Ashworth (2006)]. 
2 Ibid. at 278. 
3 C. Hamilton, Whittling the Golden Thread: The Presumption of Innocence in Irish Criminal Law (Dublin: 
Irish Academic Press, 2007) [hereinafter Hamilton (2007)]. 
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II - Whither the ‘Golden Thread’?: Confinement, erosion, evasion, side-
stepping 
 
The law is replete with encomia to the presumption of innocence. Every law 
student is also familiar with the poetic flourish of Lord Sankey in Woolmington v. 
D.P.P. on the burden of proof: “[t]hroughout the web of the English law one golden 
thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the 
prisoner’s guilt.” 4 The Irish superior courts too have acknowledged the principle as 
a ‘fundamental postulate’ of the criminal law which is constitutionally protected as 
part of the right to fair trial.5 Indeed, the Supreme Court famously held in People 
(A.G.) v. O’Callaghan that the courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle, 
being “a very real thing.”6 Yet, in a legal system which now accommodates 
preventive detention, the use of silence as evidence against an accused and 
significantly increased police powers among other developments, the ‘reality’ of the 
presumption is increasingly placed in question.  
 
In this context Ashworth’s comments about the negative effects of recent 
criminal justice policies on the presumption in England and Wales merit close 
scrutiny. He identifies threats deriving from four sources, namely:  
... confinement, by defining offences so as to reduce the effect of the 
presumption; erosion, by recognising more exceptions; evasion, by introducing 
civil law procedures in order to circumvent the rights conferred on accused 
persons; and side-stepping, by imposing restrictions on the liberty of 
unconvicted persons that fall only slightly short of depriving them of their 
liberty.7  
 
The first category appears to envisage circumvention of the presumption through 
the proliferation of absolute/strict liability offences providing for no-fault criminal 
liability. Ashworth, however, dismisses arguments that absolute/strict liability 
offences pose a threat to the principle, preferring to view these offences as offending 
the principle of ‘no criminal liability without fault’ pertaining to the substantive 
rather than the procedural realm of the criminal law. Taking his point of departure 
thus, he acknowledges that it is policies falling into the second category, namely 
                                                 
4 [1935] A.C. 462. 
5 O’Leary v. Attorney General [1993] 1 I.R. 102 (HC), [1995] 1 I.R. 254 (SC). [hereinafter O’Leary]. 
6 [1966] I.R. 501. 
7 Ashworth (2006), supra note 1 at 242 [emphasis in original]. 
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reverse-onus provisions, which present the greatest contemporary challenge to the 
presumption, although mention is also made of possible conflicts arising from the 
significant incentives to plead guilty through sentence discounts and legislative 
provisions permitting adverse inferences from pre-trial silence.  
 
The third threat resides in the promotion of legislation which provides for 
civil orders to control the behaviour of individuals such as anti-social behaviour 
orders (ASBOs). The significance of these types of order for the presumption is, as 
Ashworth argues, the evasion of the protection it normally affords defendants to 
criminal proceedings. This question was considered some years ago by the House of 
Lords in R (on the application of McCann) v. Manchester Crown Court who rejected the 
contention that ASBO proceedings were, “in reality and in substance” criminal, albeit 
with the concession that the criminal standard of proof should apply.8  While this 
has to some degree mitigated the effect of such provisions, Ashworth voices 
considerable concern over the panoply of ‘hybrid’ offences making their way onto the 
statute book in recent years. Indeed, he describes the government’s commitment to 
the presumption as “so ambivalent that it will try to avoid its application where 
possible.”9  
 
The fourth category of threats to the presumption is related to the third and 
is formed by the use of use of civil, preventive orders aimed at controlling terrorist 
activity. These ‘control orders’ were introduced following the decision of the House 
of Lords in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department holding that indefinite 
detention without trial for suspected international terrorists was incompatible with 
the Convention.10 The difference between these orders and those considered in the 
third category is that the conditions attached to such orders are so restrictive as to 
border on a deprivation of liberty. In the absence of any prospect of a criminal trial, 
the presumption of innocence stricto sensu does not apply, but one may wonder with 
Ashworth whether such “side-stepping may not impress a Strasbourg Court that 
looks to the substance of the matter.”11 
 
                                                 
8 [2003] 1 A.C. 787 at para. 22 [hereinafter McCann]. 
9 Ashworth (2006), supra note 1 at 274. 
10 [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87. 
11 Ashworth (2006), supra note 1 at 276. 
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Why should such developments concern us? Reiteration of the justifications 
for fundamental rights such as the presumption of innocence is particularly 
important if they are to be viewed not as latter-day white elephants but rather as 
rights which have an intrinsic claim on our attention. Ashworth advances four 
supporting reasons for the privileged status afforded the presumption, the first (and 
arguably overarching) of which relates to the fundamental right of an innocent 
person not to be convicted. Persons placed on trial risk public censure and loss of 
liberty as well as other serious legal and social consequences. By insisting on a 
relatively high level of certainty prior to conviction society ensures that the 
fundamental ‘moral harm’ (per Dworkin) or inherent evil of a mistaken conviction is 
kept to a minimum.12 Secondly, risk should be allocated to the prosecution on the 
basis of the ‘fragility of fact-finding at trials’ and the difficulty in establishing the 
truth many months or years after the event.13 A third reason can be located in the 
respect which the state ought to have for its citizens in a democratic society, bearing 
in mind the relative imbalance in power and resources between the citizen and the 
state. The final justification concerns the standard of proof of beyond all reasonable 
doubt which Ashworth claims serves to reinforce the previous three values of 
“proper respect for the right not to be wrongly convicted, the fragility of fact-finding 
and disparity of resources.”14  
 
Certain points may be added to Ashworth’s eloquent defence of the 
presumption in light of contemporary criticisms of due process protections such as 
the presumption of innocence. The first concerns what Kennedy terms the myth of 
the ‘benign state’: the view that the enemy is not the essentially benign state but 
rather the offender in our midst.15 As she writes: “[w]e should have learned from 
history that, in the long-run, abuses by the state are far more dangerous to liberty 
and democracy than individual criminal conduct, dangerous and disturbing as that 
is.”16 The history lesson is not confined to the bloody feuds of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The miscarriages of justice cases in England involving Irish 
persons suspected of acts of terrorism are well known. Recent cases in Ireland 
                                                 
12 See further R. M. Dworkin, “Principle, Policy, Procedure” in R. Cross, Crime, Proof and Punishment: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Rupert Cross (London: Butterworths, 1981) at 193. 
13 Ashworth (2006), supra note 1 at 248. 
14 Ibid.  at 250. 
15 H. Kennedy, Just Law: The Changing Face of Justice and Why it Matters to Us All (London:Chatto and 
Windus, 2004). 
16 Ibid. at 15. 
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concerning Nora Wall, Pablo McCabe and Dean Lyons serve as salutary reminders 
of the importance of procedural rights in avoiding an increased violation of 
individual rights and convictions of the innocent. A related point is that we are all at 
risk of unjust conviction. This requires the explosion of another important myth 
which acts as a barrier to full appreciation of the importance of the presumption of 
innocence – that of the ‘other’. It is often assumed that only ‘criminals’ will suffer, 
that ‘the innocent have nothing to fear’,17 yet these rights belong to all citizens and 
our appreciation of their importance is often stymied by viewing them in this way. 
Consider a scenario in which a family member has been detained by the police. 
Ashworth (writing elsewhere) poses the question: “[h]ow would you wish them to 
be treated? Should it be for the police to decide how long and under what conditions 
they should be kept, or should they have rights?”18 
 
Finally, in an Irish context, it is appropriate to consider the broader 
constitutional framework within which the presumption of innocence is located. 
While the presumption probably has the strongest association with Article 38.1 of 
the Constitution, which guarantees that no person shall be tried on a criminal charge 
except in “due course of law,” it should also be considered in the light of the 
commitment by the state in the Preamble to promote the common good “with due 
observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity so that the dignity and freedom of the 
individual may be assured.” This approach was clearly endorsed by O’Higgins C.J. in 
State (Healy) v. Donoghue who invoked the Preamble in support of the courts’ view of 
‘fair procedures’: “[i]n my view the Preamble makes it clear that rights given by the 
Constitution must be considered in accordance with concepts of prudence, justice 
and charity.”19  
 
Given the importance of the principle in Irish law and the existence of trends 
in Irish society similar to those described above by Ashworth,20 it is timely to 
engage in an analysis of the tangible effects of the presumption of innocence for an 
accused person in Ireland. A framework similar to Ashworth’s will be adopted for 
                                                 
17 It is disappointing to note that even the Irish Supreme Court has adopted this view on occasion. See 
Heaney v. Ireland [1994] 3 I.R. 593 and commentary of Campbell et al. on this case, infra. note 38  at 
397. 
18 A. Ashworth, Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (London: Sweet Maxwell, 2002) 
at 5-6. 
19 [1976] I.R. 325. 
20 See note 7 and accompanying text.  See further Hamilton (2007), supra note 3. 
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the purposes of assessing the threats to the presumption, although the fourth 
category of threat is not reflected in Irish law, as no statutory mechanism exists for 
effective house arrest akin to the British provisions on control orders.21  
 
III - Assessing the Buoyancy of the Presumption in Irish Law 
 
A. Confinement: Reducing the Effect of the Presumption 
 
As noted above, the view that absolute or strict liability offences conflict with 
the presumption of innocence is controversial and one which goes to the very 
definition of the presumption. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the 
arguments here.22 Proceeding however, ex abundante cautela, on the assumption that 
the presumption may have implications for the substantive criminal law, it is unclear 
whether the presumption of innocence is viewed by the Irish courts as engaged when 
considering the constitutionality of offences of strict liability or indeed their 
compatibility with Article 6(2) of the E.C.H.R.23 The case which has come closest to 
examining the issue is C.C. v. Ireland,24 where the Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional section 1 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935 which 
criminalised ‘unlawful carnal knowledge’ of a girl under 15. The Court did so on the 
basis that it was a strict liability offence which made no provision for a defence of 
honest mistake as to the age of the girl. It is notable that Hardiman J., delivering the 
judgment of the Supreme Court, did not rely on the presumption of innocence 
protected by Article 38.1 of the Constitution but rather the citizen’s right to a good 
name and liberty rights under Article 40.4. However, in the course of his judgment 
he referred to the concept of mental guilt and the criminalisation of a person who is 
                                                 
21 However, it is noteworthy that the High Court held in Brennan v. District Court Judge Brennan 
[2009] I.E.H.C. 303 that bail conditions resembling house arrest constituted a breach of Article 5 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights [hereinafter E.C.H.R.]. 
22 See further the opposing views of P. Roberts and R. A. Duff and, for a ‘third way’ those of  V. 
Tadros, “Rethinking the Presumption of Innocence” (2007) 1 Criminal Law & Philosophy 193,  P. 
Roberts “Strict liability and the presumption of innocence: An exposé of functionalist assumptions” in 
A. P. Simester, ed., Appraising strict liability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) [hereinafter 
Simester, ed.], R. A. Duff, “Strict liability, legal presumptions, and the presumption of innocence” in 
A. P. Simester, ed., ibid.  
23 The English courts have found no incompatibility with the Convention. In R. v. G. [2008] 
U.K.H.L. 37 the English House of Lords, affirming the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal, held 
that a strict liability offence which prohibited intercourse with a child under 13 was compatible with 
the Convention (incidentally, a statutory rape provision very similar to the proposed Irish provision 
discussed in Part III.B. below), they held that the interpretation and content of domestic substantive 
law is not engaged by Article 6.  
24 [2006] 4 I.R. 1. 
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‘mentally innocent’. The issue is of more than mere academic interest given recent 
moves in Ireland to amend the Constitution to allow offences of strict or absolute 
liability to be enacted where they are in some way connected to minors aged under 
18.25 While the government’s proposals for a constitutional amendment have been 
abandoned in favour of legislative reform,26 their successful passage into Irish law 
would have amounted to a sea change in our legal system, as hitherto offences of 
strict liability (with the obvious exception of offence of unlawful carnal knowledge)  
have been for regulatory type offences with minimal punishments.27 It is submitted 
that the proposed provisions would have represented a de facto if not de jure 
interference with the presumption of innocence. The practical effect for the 
defendant is clearly much worse than if s/he is afforded a defence of mistake as to 
age and asked to prove it, as is the case under the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 
2006 (enacted after the C.C. decision), although it is not clear from the wording or 
schema of this statute whether the burden on the accused is a legal or evidential one.  
 
On a more positive note, however, it is salutary to observe that the 
submissions made to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Constitutional 
Amendment which appeared to influence them in their decision not to proceed with 
constitutional reform placed great emphasis on the injustice of punishing someone 
who was morally innocent or blameless. As Dr Gerard Hogan SC wrote:  
... if one accepts the contrary argument to that of the Supreme Court, one 
might as well, for example, equally accept the constitutionality of a statutory 
offence which provided that every motorist who is involved in a car accident 
causing death is, by reason of this fact alone, automatically guilty of 
manslaughter.28 
  
Such comments, and the ultimate recommendation arrived at by the Committee, 
bode well for the influence of the presumption in this jurisdiction, despite the 
                                                 
25 The relevant sections of the abortive Twenty Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2007 stated as 
follows: 
Art. 42A.5.2 No provision of the Constitution invalidates any law providing for offences of 
absolute or strict liability committed against or in connection with a child under 18 years of age.  
Art. 42A.5.3. The provisions of the section of this Article do not in any way limit the powers of 
the Oireachtas to provide by law for any other offences of absolute or strict liability. 
26 See Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children, Second Interim 
Report on the Twenty-Eight Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2007 (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2009) 
[hereinafter Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children, Second 
Interim Report]. 
27 One major exception is the statutory offence of riot created by the Criminal Justice (Public 0rder) Act 
1994 which contains no mens rea requirement and which attracts a penalty of up to ten years’ 
imprisonment. See Hamilton (2007), supra note 3. 
28 Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children, Second Interim Report, 
supra note 26 at 36. 
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Committee’s call for legislation to definitively place the legal burden of proving 
mistake on an accused charged with sexual defilement.  
 
Other legal practices and reforms which Ashworth views as potentially 
conflicting with the presumption include the guilty plea discount and certain 
provisions curtailing the accused’s right to silence. Taking the former practice first, 
it is interesting to note that the Irish discount is roughly in line with estimations of 
the amount of the discount in England and other common law jurisdictions. While 
received wisdom places it at approximately a third of the sentence, this figure may 
also be adjusted to take into account the stage at which the plea of guilty was 
entered.29 Concerning the compatibility of the presumption with the discount, 
Ashworth makes reference to Strasbourg caselaw where a substantial incentive to 
plead guilty has been found to breach the presumption.30 In Ireland, the potential for 
improper inducement is particularly marked in certain types of cases. The 
introduction in 1999 of a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment 
in respect of persons charged with possession of drugs valued at over €13,000 has 
placed considerable pressure on such defendants to plead guilty.31 This is on account 
of the fact that judges have interpreted the legislation in such a way as to disapply 
the mandatory minimum where a defendant enters an early plea of guilty or provides 
material assistance to the Gardaí. In this situation, a typical sentence would probably 
be in the range of six to seven years (there remains considerable variation among 
Circuit Court judges). This is problematic as the greater the differential between the 
sentence which would be received after trial and the sentence received on a plea, the 
greater the coercive power of the discount.  
 
Some comment must also be reserved for recent legislative developments 
impacting on the right to silence. While the relationship between this right and the 
presumption is a contested one in the academic literature,32 it has been recognised by 
                                                 
29 Criminal Justice Act 1999, s. 29 provides that the sentencing court, if it considers it appropriate to do 
so, shall take account of the stage at which the person indicated an intention to plead guilty and the 
circumstances in which this indication was given. 
30 Ashworth (2006), supra note 1  at 256. He cites Deweer v. Belgium (1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 439. 
31 Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, s. 15A as inserted by Criminal Justice Act 1999, s.4. 
32 The argument taken by those who do not see a connection between the two rights is that an 
accused may still enjoy the benefit of reasonable doubt at trial as the drawing of adverse inferences 
relates only to the means by which evidence is gathered by the state. This is the position which has 
been taken by the Irish Supreme Court in Rock v. Ireland [1997] 3 I.R. 484, [1998] 2 I.L.R.M. 35 and 
is also one which is argued for by various legal commentators such as I. Dennis “Instrumental 
Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reassessing the Privilege Against Self-
11  Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) 
Ashworth and others33 that, in a practical sense, inference drawing provisions may 
affect the ‘principled asymmetry’ between the state and the accused. Ashworth 
argues that this balance is particularly affected at the pre-trial stage when the power 
differential between the state and accused may be at its greatest and the state has not 
yet made out a case to answer. Applying his observations to newly enacted Irish 
provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2007 (2007 Act) and the Criminal Justice 
(Amendment) Act 2009 (2009 Act) strong concerns must be voiced about their impact 
on the presumption. Section 30 of the 2007 Act inserts section 19A into the Criminal 
Justice Act 1984 (1984 Act) allowing a court to draw an adverse inference from an 
accused person’s failure during questioning to mention a fact which s/he later relies 
on in defence. A number of safeguards exist for a suspect in these circumstances, 
including the right to be cautioned as to the effect of the provisions, to have the 
interview electronically recorded and (perhaps most significantly) the right to 
consult with a solicitor immediately prior to answering the relevant questions. Yet, 
to recall Ashworth’s comments, it is a matter of some anxiety that inferences may be 
drawn in a situation where the suspect and his/her solicitor is not fully appraised of 
the state case against him/her and where the solicitor is not present during 
interviews.34 This important power differential raises questions about the extent to 
which adverse inference provisions compromise (at least at the level of ‘tangible 
consequences’35) evidential guarantees of prosecutorial proof beyond all reasonable 
doubt. New provisions aimed at those involved in organised crime are even broader 
in their import. Section 9 of the 2009 Act inserts section 72A into the Criminal Justice 
Act 2006 (2006 Act) so that adverse inferences can be drawn against such suspects 
where they fail to answer any question “material to the investigation of the offence” 
during the pre-trial period.36 As noted by the Irish Human Rights Commission,37 
this is defined very broadly to include potentially all questions on a person’s 
movements, actions, activities or associations. Additionally, unlike the adverse 
                                                                                                                                            
Incrimination” (1995) 54(2) C.L.J. 342 and P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
33 See, for example J. E. Stannard, “A Presumption and Four Burdens” (1994) 51(4) N.I.L.Q. 560 and 
S. Easton, The Case for the Right to Silence, 2nd ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). 
34 D.P.P. v. Healy [1990] 2 I.R. 73, Lavery v. Member in Charge, Carrickmacross Garda Station, [1999] 2 
I.R. 390. 
35 To use Tribe’s term. See L. Tribe “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process” (1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 at 1370. 
36 Criminal Justice Act 2006, s.72A as inserted by Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, s.9. 
37 Irish Human Rights Commission, Observations on the Scheme of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill 
2009 (Dublin: Irish Human Rights Commission, 2009). 
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inference provision in the 2007 Act, there is no provision that the circumstances at 
the time clearly called for an explanation from the accused.  
 
B. Exceptions to the Presumption 
 
As in England and Wales, statutory exceptions to the presumption in the 
form of reverse onus provisions are occurring with increasing frequency. Campbell et 
al cite at least three significant statutory presumptions and reverse onus clauses 
enacted in the last ten years or so,38 relating to liabilities of company law officers 
under the Companies Acts 1965-2009, possession of drugs and duties under health and 
safety legislation. Further, these provisions join a long list of statutory exceptions in 
the terrorist realm of the type at issue in cases such as O’Leary39 and Hardy v. Ireland 
(considered below).40 Part of the problem, it is submitted, stems from the overly 
deferential approach taken by the judiciary to legislative encroachments such that 
“scant, almost dismissive, attention” is afforded the arguments of those pleading 
unconstitutionality.41  
 
The first of these cases, O’Leary,42 turned on the interpretation of section 24 
of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 which provides that possession or proof of 
possession by an accused of certain “incriminating documents” shall be “evidence, 
without more, until the contrary is proved” that the accused was a member of an 
unlawful organisation. Costello J. in the High Court concluded that section 24 only 
imposed an evidential burden of proof on the defendant, not a legal burden. Thus, the 
defendant could elect not to call evidence in the case and would still be entitled to an 
acquittal if the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. His 
decision was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court. O’Flaherty J. held that the 
effect of the section was to amount to evidence only, the value of which could be 
shaken by cross examination, or by pointing to the mental capacity of the accused or 
circumstances by which he or she came to be in possession of the document.  
 
                                                 
38 L. Campbell, S. Kilcommins & C. O’Sullivan, Criminal Law in Ireland: Cases and Commentary. 
(Dublin: Clarus Press, 2007) [hereinafter Campbell et al.]. 
39 O’Leary, supra note 5. 
40 Hardy v. Ireland, [1994] 2 I.R. 55 [hereinafter Hardy].  For further discussion of this case see note 
43 and accompanying text. 
41 Campbell et al., supra note 38 at 349. 
42 O’Leary, supra note 5. 
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The second decision on statutory presumptions and the presumption of 
innocence was Hardy,43 which this time related to section 4 of the Explosive 
Substances Act 1883. The section provides that it is an offence for: 
 ... any person who makes or has knowingly in his possession or under his 
control any explosive substance under such circumstances as to give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that he is not making it or does not have it in his 
possession or under his control for a lawful object, unless he can show that he 
made it or had it in his possession or under his control for a lawful object.44  
A majority of the Supreme Court (Hederman, O’Flaherty and Blayney JJ. 
concurring) held that the section merely placed an evidential burden on the accused 
and therefore did not violate the presumption. The minority, on the other hand, 
acknowledged that the legal burden had moved but did not proffer persuasive 
argument as to why this did not meet with constitutional difficulties.  
 
It is possible to view the above decisions in two lights. First, one could argue 
that the Supreme Court has ‘read down’ the impugned sections in a manner akin to 
the English courts discussed below so as to maximise the protection provided to the 
presumption of innocence. This does not appear to be the case, however, as there was 
no acknowledgement in either of the cases that the statutory provision did in fact 
reverse the probative burden (a truer reading of the section in Hardy,45 it is 
submitted). Moreover, a less benign view of the judgments laments the complete 
lack of guidance in an area impacting directly on the parameters of a cornerstone 
principle of the criminal law. In relation to these decisions Ní Raifertaigh has 
remarked: 
[t]he presumption of innocence and its ramifications are barely touched on; 
... . No indication is given of whether there are limits to statutory restrictions 
of the presumption of innocence or what these limits might be; indeed, the 
approach of the majority almost appears to envisage that statute may restrict 
the presumption at will. If so, it is difficult to see any difference between the 
Irish position and that in England, where there is no constitutional guarantee 
of the presumption of innocence.46 
  
A coda may be added to Ní Raifeartaigh’s argument. English law has moved on since 
the publication of her article with the incorporation of the E.C.H.R. and a number of 
challenges to various statutory provisions. In two important cases the House of 
                                                 
43 Hardy, supra note 40. 
44 Explosive Substances Act 1883, s. 4 [emphasis added]. 
45 Hardy, supra note 40. 
46 U. Ní Raifeartaigh “Reversing the Burden of Proof in a Criminal Trial: Canadian and Irish 
Perspectives on the Presumption of Innocence” (1995) 5 I.C.L.J. 135 at 153. 
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Lords has used its interpretive power under the Human Rights Act 1998 to convert 
many persuasive or legal burdens into mere evidential burdens.47 While different 
views continue to be taken of different statutory provisions,48 a number of principles 
can be derived from the case law, namely: that a statute may place a legal or 
evidential onus on the defence depending on the gravity of the conduct; the 
seriousness of the offence; the precise justification for placing the burden on the 
accused; and the degree of difficulty that the accused may have in discharging that 
burden.49 In Ireland, Hardy is authority for the proposition that reversals of the 
evidential and, potentially, legal burden of proof (and therefore prima facie breaches 
of the presumption of innocence) are constitutionally permissible but little else.50  
Given the existence in English law of criteria which can be said to afford some 
protection to the accused, at least in relation to more serious criminal offences, it 
would appear, paradoxically, that the golden thread in Ireland enjoys a level of 
protection not dissimilar to that which it is afforded in a jurisdiction where it is 
without constitutional imprimatur. 
 
While the above threat to the presumption (constituted by an absence of 
protective principles) cannot be minimised, by far the most significant development 
in this area in Ireland in recent years derives from a series of judgments delivered in 
the context of historic sexual abuse allegations where an order of prohibition has 
been sought on the grounds of delay. As Campbell et al rightly observe this 
jurisprudence represented a serious challenge to the ‘normative legitimacy’ of the 
principle.51 A line of authority developed by the Irish Supreme Court — formulated 
in the decisions of P.C. v. D.P.P.,52 J.O’C. v. D.P.P.53 and P.O’C. v. D.P.P.54 — 
mandated a temporary assumption of guilt in relation to the charge of sexual abuse 
when the review court is considering the reasons advanced for the long periods of 
delay by complainants in revealing and reporting these offences. The former 
                                                 
47 R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 A.C. 346, R. v. Lambert [2002] 2 A.C. 
545 [hereinafter Lambert]. 
48 As Ashworth (2006),  supra  note 1 observes there are a number of decisions which appear to 
prioritise public safety over the presumption of innocence. See, for example, R. v. Johnstone [2003] 1 
W.L.R. 1736, Sheldrake v. D.P. P. [2005] 1 A.C. 264.  
49 Lambert, supra note 47. Peter Murphy notes that, despite differing decisions by the House of Lords 
on the legal and evidential burden, these principles have been applied fairly consistently, P. Murphy, 
Murphy on Evidence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 94. 
50 Hardy, supra note 40. 
51 Campbell et al., supra note 38 at 332. 
52 [1999] 2 I.R. 25. 
53 [2000] 3 I.R. 478 [hereinafter J.O’C.]. 
54 [2000] 3 I.R. 87 [hereinafter P. O’C.]. 
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Supreme Court outlined a three prong test when considering whether an order 
prohibiting the trial should be made. The first question concerned whether the delay 
is so long that the trial should be prohibited on account of the delay alone in the 
absence of specific prejudice. This requirement was rarely, if ever, satisfied. The 
second question required an assessment of the reasons for the delay and at this stage 
the defendant was to be presumed guilty of the offences, allowing an inquiry into 
whether “the delay in making [the complaint] was referable to the accused’s own 
actions.”55 At the third stage of the test the usual protections applied in determining 
whether the delay has prejudiced the defence to such an extent that there is a real 
and serious risk of an unfair trial. As pointed out by members of the minority in 
J.O’C. and P.O’C.,56 these decisions — in turning the presumption on its head — 
represented an unacceptable interference with the rights of the accused. Hardiman J. 
opined in J.O’C. that “there is in my view no basis whatever for assuming the truth 
of the allegations against the defendant, prior to conviction, for any purpose or in 
any proceedings.”57 Similarly, Murray J. in P.O’C. held that an assumption of guilt, 
however contingent, is “inconsistent with the fundamental rights of a citizen.”58 For 
both judges the only relevant inquiry in such cases was whether the accused ran a 
real and serious risk of an unfair trial.  
 
While it should be noted that the Supreme Court clearly viewed this 
abrogation of the presumption as highly exceptional, the fact that efforts were made 
to limit the reversal of the presumption of innocence to a discrete process and area of 
law does not provide an answer to the argument that due process protections were 
being denied to the very defendants who needed them most. Society is 
understandably uncomfortable with child sex offenders but it is precisely at this 
juncture that the rules of evidence and due process guarantees are “necessary to 
counterbalance our prejudices as fact-finders.”59 In any event, in a reconstituted 
Supreme Court (Murray C.J. presiding) the law has been restated and the 
presumption reasserted. In the decision of S.H. v. D.P.P. the Supreme Court moved 
                                                 
55 J. O’C., supra note 53 at 478.  
56 J. O’C, ibid., P.O’C., supra note 54. 
57 J.O’C., ibid. at 517. 
58 P.O’C., supra note 54 at 104. 
59 C. Fennell “The Culture of Decision Making: A Case for Judicial Defiance through Evidence and 
Fact-Finding” [2001] J.S.I.J. 25 at 65 [hereinafter Fennell]. 
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away from the issue of culpability of the accused in explaining the delay to focus on 
the overriding issue of the accused’s right to a fair trial.60  
 
C. Evasion: Recourse to the Civil Law 
 
The contemporary preoccupation with risk and the reorientation of the 
criminal justice system towards the control of offenders thought to pose particular 
risks to social order and security is seen by Ashworth as productive of effects 
inimical to the presumption of innocence. It has been noted elsewhere that Ireland 
has remained relatively immune to risk analysis in its penal discourse and practice at 
least in its narrow computational sense.61 Certainly, we have not witnessed the 
proliferation of civil orders which have been introduced in recent years in the UK 
such as football banning orders, violent offender orders, etc. To some degree, 
however, the state’s preoccupation with certain risk groups is evident through the 
recent introduction of anti social behaviour orders and the introduction in 2001 of 
sex offender orders.62  
 
The 2006 Act made provision for ‘civil orders’ similar to the English ASBO 
but with a slightly narrower definition and lesser penalties for breach.63 As discussed 
in Part II, hard questions must be asked concerning whether the procedure is being 
used as a means of subverting the strictures of the criminal law, including the 
presumption of innocence. Irish defendants without the benefit of the presumption in 
civil order proceedings can face penalties of up to six months’ imprisonment for 
breach of the order. Section 115(9) of the 2006 Act states clearly that the standard of 
proof required is the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. In relation to the 
cognate issue of the admissibility of hearsay evidence the 2006 Act is silent; however, 
given that the proceedings are civil in nature it would appear that hearsay evidence 
may be admitted to the extent that it is permitted in civil proceedings and in 
                                                 
60 [2006] 3 I.R. 575 at 620. 
61 S. Kilcommins, I. O'Donnell, E. O'Sullivan and B. Vaughan,  Crime, Punishment and the Search for 
Order in Ireland (Dublin: International Publishers Association, 2004)  at 256 write: “it could not be 
said that risk analysis, in its narrow computational sense, is coming to dominate penal discourse or 
practice in Ireland.” 
62 Sex Offenders Act 2001, Part 3. 
63 Anti-social behaviour capable of triggering an order is defined in s. 113(2) as:  
[behaviour] in a manner that caused or, in all the circumstances, was likely to cause to one 
or more persons not of the same household: (a) harassment (b) significant or persistent 
alarm, distress, fear or (c) significant or persistent impairment of their use or enjoyment of 
their property. 
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practice, the rule is applied with less vigour in civil rather than criminal matters. 
McCann may certainly prove persuasive authority for the Irish courts should issues 
arise in relation to the compatibility of the legislation with Article 6 of the 
E.C.H.R.64  subject, of course, to a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights 
on the issue.65 On the other hand, section 115(9) is difficult to reconcile with the dicta 
of their Lordships in McCann as to the standard of proof.66 
 
A related matter is the constitutionality of the legislation in the light of 
Article 38.1 (the right to a trial in due course of law) which enshrines the 
presumption of innocence for persons charged with a criminal offence. Should the 
courts find that the relevant provisions of the 2006 Act were in reality criminal and 
the necessary safeguards had therefore been avoided, they would be struck down as 
unconstitutional. Key to such a determination is the issue of whether the courts will 
consider the initial application for an ASBO as capable of separation from the later 
proceedings for breach. Despite the conclusion reached by their Lordships in 
McCann,67 there are compelling reasons for finding that they are inextricably linked: 
the initial hearing defines the scope of the order and therefore determines the extent 
of the defendant’s criminal liability, indeed, it is impossible to defend proceedings for 
breach without harking back to the terms of the original order. As argued by Binchy 
“there is an integration between each stage: the civil element is a necessary 
precondition of the criminal element: it defines the outer limits – and indeed may 
well define the full scope – of the conduct that can constitute a crime.”68  
 
Another point, cogently made by McDonald,69 is that a person sentenced for 
breach of a civil order will in all likelihood be punished, not just for one act of 
defiance of the order, but for the previous anti-social acts committed by that person 
which led to the imposition of the order. It must be said, however, that cause for 
optimism that the courts will adopt an approach of ‘substance over form’ would not 
be derived from a brief survey of the Irish case law on the characterization of 
                                                 
64 McCann, supra note 8. 
65 The decision is under appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. 
66 McCann, supra note 8. 
67 Ibid. 
68 W. Binchy “Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and the Constitution” (Conference on Anti-Social 
Behaviour Orders: Social Policy and Human Rights, Trinity College Dublin, 22 June 2005). 
69 S. McDonald “The Nature of the Anti-Social Behaviour Order – R (McCann & Others) v. Crown 
Court at Manchester” (2003) 66 M.L.R. 630. 
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proceedings as civil or criminal. The High Court in Gilligan v. Criminal Assets Bureau 
held that since the civil forfeiture procedure introduced under the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 1996 was labelled and operated as a civil process, it did not have “all the features 
of a criminal prosecution.”70 This decision was followed by O’Higgins J. in M.F. 
Murphy v. G.M., P.B., P.C. Ltd., G.H.71 and both these decisions were upheld by the 
Supreme Court in a joint appeal.72 The crux of the Supreme Court’s reasoning was 
that the indicia of criminal proceedings such as arrest, detention and admission to 
bail were not present. The narrow interpretation of ‘criminal’ adopted in these 
decisions, focusing on the labels and procedures of the procedure itself, is redolent of 
the House of Lords’ approach in McCann,73 and would suggest that the hybrid 
structure of which ASBOs are comprised may well pass the constitutional litmus 
test. 
 
IV -  Possible Explanations 
 
The above analysis seems to suggest at a minimum some cause for concern as 
to the practical effect of the presumption of innocence for suspects and accused 
persons in Ireland thus inviting questions as to the causes of this trend on both sides 
of the Irish Sea. In an Irish context several explanations have been advanced which 
merit scrutiny. Walsh, employing Packer’s normative models, argues that the 
dramatic alteration of the criminal justice landscape in Ireland since the Criminal 
Justice Act 1984 marks a progressive shift away from a ‘due process’ to a ‘crime 
control’ model.74 Packer’s framework is valuable as an interpretive device directing 
attention to recent trends in criminal justice but his models are not a substitute for 
an explanatory analysis of the processes at work in criminal justice policy. In this 
regard, Campbell’s arguments concerning the challenges to liberal constitutionalism 
in Ireland from the communitarian model hold much interest.75 The Irish 
Constitution, which protects due process rights such as the presumption of 
                                                 
70 [1998] 3 I.R. 185. 
71 Unreported, High Court, O’Higgins J., 4 June 1999 [hereinafter Murphy]. 
72  Ibid.; Gilligan v. C.A.B. [2001] 4 I.R. 113. 
73 McCann, supra note 8. 
74 D. Walsh, “The Criminal Justice Bill: Completing a Crime Control Model of Criminal Justice?” 
(Conference on the Criminal Justice Bill 2004: Implications for Human Rights and Legal Practice, 
Trinity College Dublin, 20 April 2005), citing H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1968). 
75 L. Campbell “From Due Process to Crime Control: the Decline of Liberalism in the Irish Criminal 
Justice System” (2007) 25 I.L.T. 281. 
19  Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) 
innocence by virtue of Article 38.1, is firmly rooted in the liberal democratic 
tradition. However, Campbell detects in recent political statements advocating the 
striking of a balance between the rights of the accused and the ‘rights of society’ a 
tacit endorsement of communitarian principles. For example, she notes that in the 
context of the debate surrounding reforms of the right to silence, strident opposition 
was mounted to the principle on the basis that “it does not acknowledge the right of 
society as being equal to the right of the individual regarding a criminal 
prosecution.”76 Her arguments hold much merit and indeed can be applied to judicial 
decision making. As Fennell has observed, such rhetoric is also often employed in 
judicial decisions which seek to identify the community or public interest with that 
of the victim, often to the detriment of the accused. 77 This type of communitarian 
reasoning renders the rights of the individual indivisible from the (variable) wishes 
of majority and, in so doing, neglects the interest which the community itself 
possesses in imposing limits on state power (to recall the arguments on the ‘myth of 
the other’ in Part II above).  
 
Yet, it is questionable to what degree the liberal model itself is above 
reproach. Examining contemporary penal developments in Australia and elsewhere, 
Brown has sought to connect such developments with exclusionary themes inherent 
within the structure of liberal doctrine.78 He draws attention to the conditional 
nature of political liberty as originally formulated by Mill.79 ‘Barbarous’ or ‘rude 
peoples’ for example, were considered incapable of self discipline and ‘autonomy’ was 
thus recognised by Mill as a precondition to full political participation. Colonial rule, 
conceptualised in this way within the bounds of liberalism, facilitated the 
constitution of a distinct type of political subject: the colonial subject of exclusion. 
Brown’s arguments find a resonance in Irish criminal justice policy as it applies to 
subversive offenders and, more recently, ‘organised’ or ‘gangland’ criminals.80 As 
with the colonial subject, the character of those suspected of involvement in 
paramilitary activity was so suspect that their incapacity to function as a political 
subject was assumed. The result was a denial of key political rights such as jury trial 
                                                 
76 Ibid. at text accompanying note 86.     
77 C. Fennell, supra note 59. 
78 M. Brown, “Liberal exclusions and the new punitiveness” in J. Pratt et al., eds., The New 
Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives, (Devon: Willan, 2005) at  272-289.  
79 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, including Selections from Auguste Comte 
and Positivism (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1972). 
80 See further C. Hamilton, “Organised Criminals as Agents of Obligation: The Case of Ireland” 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research [forthcoming]. 
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and the privilege against self incrimination.81 Given that this exclusionary form of 
liberal constitutional model forms our inheritance today, it is perhaps only in this 
context that we can fully appreciate the renegotiation of the relationship between the 
state and the citizen currently at play, especially as it relates to those accused of 
serious offending. As argued elsewhere, it is often only through examination of 
national level political, legal and institutional factors that we can fully appreciate the 
factors influencing the determination of criminal justice policy.82 
 
V - Conclusion 
 
It may, not unreasonably, be expected that the presumption of innocence 
would be better protected in a jurisdiction such as Ireland where it is afforded 
constitutional standing. The reality is much more nuanced, however, with both 
positive and negative features. Certain of Ashworth’s threats to the presumption are 
also discernible in Ireland, particularly with regard to incentives to plead guilty, 
legislative curtailment of the right to silence and the growing legislative tendency of 
imposing burdens on the defence. In other respects the approach of the two 
jurisdictions to the presumption differs considerably. At least with regard to the 
principles governing the validity of exceptions to the presumption, the much more 
structured approach taken by the English courts means that a comparison with 
recent English jurisprudence is unfavourable. This divergence is perhaps surprising 
given the recent incorporation of the E.C.H.R. in both jurisdictions. While it may be 
expected that the Irish case law will evolve as further challenges are brought under 
Article 6(2) of the Convention, this may be some distance away given the 
conservative, even defensive approach taken by the Supreme Court to the 
Convention in the recent case of McD. v. L.83 It is to be hoped that in the near future 
a full consideration of the ramifications of reverse onus provisions, particularly those 
governing the drugs and terrorism areas, will eventually be undertaken in Ireland in 
light of the important normative principles inherent in the presumption. Better 
                                                 
81 Through the establishment of the non-jury special criminal courts and legislation such as s. 52 of 
the Offences Against the State Act 1939 which allows a Garda to demand an account of a suspect’s 
movements and actions during any specified period and all information in his or her possession in 
relation to the commission of specified offences. Failure to comply constitutes a criminal offence 
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Scotland and New Zealand (PhD thesis, UCD, 2010). 
83 [2009] I.E.S.C. 81. 
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efforts should be made to clarify the existing law and, through the development of 
normative principles, to secure the constitutional status on the presumption of 
innocence. This task assumes particular urgency given the short-lived, yet 
egregious, reversal of the presumption in a series of historic sexual abuse cases since 
the mid-1990s.  
 
There are, however, other regards in which a cleaner bill of health may be 
given for the presumption in Irish law. While the entrenchment in Irish law of 
preventive civil orders represents a clear attempt at a deliberate blurring of the lines 
between civil and criminal process, there is an important gap here between the law 
in books and in practice. In relation to anti-social behaviour, for example, only six 
civil orders have been issued since the legislation was introduced.84 This failure of 
implementation combined with the lesser enthusiasm shown by the Irish 
government for the introduction of hybrid orders effectively evading the 
presumption, renders this threat to the presumption in Ireland less urgent than that 
posed by the other categories. Finally, one may note with some sense of satisfaction 
the recent decision by the Irish government not to pursue a constitutional 
amendment facilitating the introduction of absolute/strict liability offences. The 
strong objection taken to the criminalisation of the ‘morally innocent’ by 
commentators opposed to the amendment speaks to the continued potency of liberal 
constitutionalism and a paradigm of criminal law with the presumption of innocence 
at its core. 
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